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Abstract. Quality of service (QoS) requirements, which 
include availability, integrity, performance and 
responsiveness are increasingly needed by science and 
engineering applications. Rising computational demands 
and data mining present a new challenge in the IT world. 
As our needs for more processing, research and analysis 
increase, performance and reliability degrade 
exponentially. In this paper we present a software system 
that manages quality of service for Unix based distributed 
application clusters. Our approach is synthetic and 
involves intelligent agents that make use of static and 
dynamic ontologies to monitor, diagnose and correct 
faults at run time, over a private network. Finally, we 
provide experimental results from our pilot 
implementation in a production environment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Researchers, analysts, scientists and engineers, need 
reliable and powerful systems. Having the ability to run 
multiple analyses, experiments and realistic simulations 
can lead to new and more comprehensive discoveries. 
Research scientists and engineers can properly research 
by performing experiments in a trial and error mode. Most 
researchers are led to the wrong conclusions as they are 
faced with processing problems. To overcome them, they 
reduce sample populations. Alternative scenarios cannot 
be investigated thoroughly and creativity cannot be fully 
expressed. Delivery of processing outputs and timing get 
adversely affected as well. Opportunities get lost this way 
too, if it takes months to determine which is the best 
processing technique for atomic energy for example. Data 
mining techniques cannot be put to their full use, as by 
nature they are processing intensive. The majority of 
database servers cannot withstand the load of running 
repeated comparisons of large data groups against a set of 
possible parameters and outcomes. Processing needs to be 
smooth, transparent and efficient. 
  Robust, dependable infrastructures are very difficult to 
maintain [1]. Complex environments are difficult and 
costly to manage and, generally speaking, complexity 
reduces the predictability and reliability of application 
services and systems [12, 17]. Due to this complexity, it is 
usually quite difficult to identify performance problems, 
bottlenecks or failures promptly. Analysing collected 
availability and performance data can be a time-
consuming thankless task that requires pain-staking 
manual labour. Deciding upon a course of action to 
resolve failures and performance problems may take 
weeks and can be very costly. With the exponential 
growth of distributed clusters and emerging grids, the 
matching human component is simply not available [3, 4, 
12]. We urgently need to reconsider the way we build 
infrastructures and troubleshoot faults. Infrastructures, 
(hardware, network and software) are essential 
prerequisites for efficient service delivery. In this paper, 
we propose a solution to these problems by introducing 
the architectural framework for a fault-tolerant, self-
managing, intelligent infrastructure for Unix based 
distributed application clusters. 
  This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we 
discuss related work. In section 3 our building 
methodology and approach, while section 4 discusses 
some preliminary results from one of our implementations 
at a UK-based financial customer site. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
Structured troubleshooting and fault correction 
approaches are widely used in the application domain. 
These techniques include recursive restarts [5], check 
pointing [18], reboot [12] and undoing old configurations 
[12]. The check-pointing technique allows applications to 
recover from the last point of failure by copying on a 
regular basis their status on stable storage and then 
retrieving it. Application recursive restarts are based on 
the principle of infrastructure-centric software design: 
move intelligence from endpoints into the supporting 
infrastructure. Reboot, restarts not only the application 
but also the underlying operating system and undoing old 
configurations involves restoring old backups and 
overwriting current assumed “invalid” settings. A newer 
approach is the N-layered architecture for application 
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 development that allows for resiliency and better 
performance [2]. 
  A lot of important work has been done in the areas of 
fault diagnosis, performance and decision-making. 
Current diagnostic methods include: the threshold 
analysis, the bottleneck analysis, the what’s different 
analysis and the correlation analysis [9, 10]. Closely 
related to our project is also the very important work done 
by John Wilkes and R. Golding on self-managing, self-
configuring storage [8, 19]. In addition, fault and/or 
decision trees are commonly used to diagnose faults and 
action corrective measures. 
  There are a number of tools that measure performance 
and monitor systems. These include BMC, HPGlance 
Plus, HP Measureware, SystemEdge, Sun Management 
Centre, TeamQuest, Landmark Performance Works, 
Aurora Software Sarcheck, Foglight Software RAPS, 
Compuware Ecotools, Datametrics Viewpoint, Metron 
Athene, Network Weather Service (mostly for networks) 
etc [6]. To our knowledge, there are no commercial tools 
that automatically correct performance problems. 
 
3. Building Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
 
Our approach involves: 
1. Unix shell based intelligent agents that monitor, 
troubleshoot and manage distributed services within 
the datacentre. These agents also collect detailed 
system performance/availability measurements. 
2. Dedicated administration servers that act as external 
agent coordinators in a high-availability failover 
configuration and share a common pool of NFS 
mounted disks, to avoid single points of failure.  
3. A dedicated private network, where all agent-related 
traffic goes through to avoid congesting the public 
LAN. 
4. Static and dynamic ontologies [7, 15]. These 
ontologies include: 
a. Index static service lists (ISSL) that contain very 
basic information about each server or resource IP 
address and services. They can contain up to 200 
entries and are manually updated. 
b. Dynamic local service profiles (DLSP) that are 
generated by each agent controlled server in 
regular intervals and contain information about 
server hardware, software, load, capacity and 
services. 
c. Static local knowledge templates (SLKT) that 
contain information about what the server should 
be like hardware-wise, which applications it should 
run, all application external and internal 
dependencies and requirements (file systems, path 
names, application component startup sequences, 
binary location, application type, version, name, IP 
address, port it listens to – if any, application 
process names and numbers, etc.). 
d. Dynamic global service profile lists (DGSPL) that 
contain information about all running and available 
services across the entire datacentre. Available 
services are presented by <Server type, OS, 
memory and CPUs, Application type and version, 
Current Load, Users logged in, Geographical 
Location, Site Name>. These lists can also be used 
to present services to grids. 
3.2. Assumptions 
 
We make the following assumptions: 
? All servers are Unix-based and NTP (time) 
synchronized. 
? For all applications participating in the 
datacentre (databases, web servers etc), we have 
startup and shutdown scripts. 
? Specialized application developers have 
provided us with tools and methodologies to test 
and confirm if these applications are up and 
running and available to be used, that have been 
incorporated in the agent source code and 
ontology definition. In addition these people 
have provided us with application specific 
connectivity time-out definitions. 
? All ontologies, templates, files and logs 
produced are flat ASCII files generated by I/O 
Unix pipes, readable by most Unix tools 
(operators) and human administrators. 
? The maximum load a server can successfully 
sustain has been provided to us by either 
hardware/operating system manufacturers 
combined with practical experience information 
by human experts and adapted based on our own 
observations. 
? All communications are based on TCP/IP. 
? We use the term application/service 
interchangeably, as in the context of this paper, 
applications are service vehicles. 
? We assume that the majority of distributed 
services run on physically separate Unix servers. 
3.3 Intelligent agents 
 
Intelligent agents [20] or intelliagents are Unix programs 
that monitor systems and services and wherever possible 
automatically correct run-time operational faults with as 
little downtime as possible. They are also responsible for 
collecting detailed performance, load and availability 
measurements for systems and services. They can be 
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 thought of as huge wrappers that can be used to 
administer, maintain and troubleshoot every single 
infrastructure aspect. Intelliagents use constraint-based 
causal reasoning [13]. The data structures they use are flat 
ASCII textual ontologies which contain minimum and 
maximum software and hardware related variables, as 
well as application information. Our static ontologies 
represent the constraints in the reasoning. Intelliagents are 
not memory resident. They are highly modular. They are 
installed locally on each server they monitor, always in 
the same physical location “/apps/intelliagents”. They are 
“awakened” every X minutes (every 5 minutes for 
example) by local to each host Unix crons. Intelliagents 
do not use a relational database (to avoid corruptions and 
for simplicity), they use static ontologies in the form of 
static knowledge templates and service lists to generate 
dynamic ones. Ontologies are being used in logic, 
mathematics and Artificial Intelligence. An ontology is “a 
description (like a formal specification of a program) of 
the concepts and relationships that can exist for an agent 
or a community of agents” [7]. The subject of ontology is 
“the study of the categories of things that exist or may 
exist in a domain” [15]. 
  All intelliagent related communication goes through the 
private agent network to avoid putting any 
performance/load overheads to the public LANs (see 
Figure 1). All participating devices and resources in the 
datacentre are connected to the private agent network and 
one or more public LANs. If the private network fails, 
intelliagents can automatically re-route their 
communication traffic over the public LAN, using Unix 
administration commands. 
     
H O S T
P U B L I C  L A N
H O S T H O S T
H O S T
I N T E L L I A G E N T  P R I V A T E  N E T W O R K
A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  S E R V E R S
R E S O U R C E S R E S O U R C E S R E S O U R C E S
I N T E L L I A G E N T  N E T W O R K   
 
Figure 1. A hi-level view of the intelliagent private network and administration servers. All intelliagent 
communications go through the private intelliagent LAN to avoid loading public LANs. 
 
  Whenever a local intelliagent runs, it produces a flag in 
the dedicated “/logs/intelliagents/intelliagent_name” 
directory on the local server disk to show the status of the 
run. A number of flags are produced with appropriate 
naming conventions that show what happened and exactly 
where the agent found a fault. Absence of these flags 
means that we either have an internal intelliagent problem 
or that they did not run at all. Administration servers 
monitor the creation of these flags every X+5 minutes, 
where X is the frequency intelliagent run, i.e. every 10 
minutes (adjustable parameter). If these flags are not 
there, they start troubleshooting intelliagent processes. 
For each component there is one special intelliagent (such 
as one for the CPU, one for the network card etc). 
Whenever an agent detects an error it tries to fix it. All 
intelliagents run in parallel, in a distributed manner and 
do not depend on each other. At startup each intelliagent 
checks to see if any other of the same type is running, if 
so it exits – i.e. one can never have two backup 
intelliagents running at the same time. It also removes 
flags from previous runs and old local dynamic service 
profiles. Intelliagents are monitored by dedicated external 
administration servers to ensure correct function. 
  For each application type there are customized error 
categories. Application health is determined by 
attempting to connect to them every Y minutes and run 
basic commands (such as a get on a web server process 
for example). This is essentially the way intelliagents 
communicate with applications – by trying to use them 
and read the resulting exit code in the Unix shell. 
  Each intelliagent has 5 major parts: a) Monitoring, b) 
Diagnosing, c) Self-Healing/Action/Repair, d) 
Communication/Logging, e) Self-maintenance. The 
monitoring part is tasked to look after one particular 
system resource or aspect. Whenever the monitored 
subject does not respond as expected, the diagnosing part 
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 is invoked and goes through a series of tests to determine 
the root of the problem. The diagnostic procedure is done 
in two ways; statically and dynamically. Statically, from 
parsing and examining error logs and dynamically by the 
use of Unix administration commands to ensure the best 
possible diagnosis. Based on these findings the self-
healing portion gets activated and starts repairing the 
faults. The communication part is responsible for 
communicating with other intelliagents and human 
operators. It is also responsible for logging all intelliagent 
activities and results. 
  Self-maintenance is an integral part of all intelliagents 
and every time an intelliagent runs, it looks after its 
individual logs. Each of the five intelliagent parts can get 
activated or deactivated either during installation or 
subsequently. 
  Intelliagents are classified based on their functions and 
tasks. Intelliagent categories include: 1) Hardware agents 
that look after hardware components (CPU, memory, 
boards etc), 2) Operating system/network agents that look 
after all OS and network related aspects, 3) Resource 
intelliagents that are responsible for managing and 
configuring resources such as disks, network cards, 
virtual memory etc, 4) Application/Service intelliagents 
that manage and troubleshoot local and global 
application/services across the datacentre, 5) Status 
intelliagents that dynamically generate status profiles for 
servers, resources and services in terms of availability, 
load, capacity and geographical location, and 6) 
Performance intelliagents that collect performance and 
availability logs. These intelliagents can suggest what 
may be wrong during service degradation and have 
limited troubleshooting capabilities. 
3.4 Service management 
 
Service management is handled in a what could be called 
unorthodox way. Each local server in the datacentre is 
responsible for “knowing” and taking care of its own 
resources and services. Its local status intelliagent is 
“awakened” by the Unix cron and compiles dynamically 
its local DLSP. 
  To confirm that local services are available on each 
server, the local status intelliagent invokes local service 
intelliagents who attempt to connect to local running 
services and perform very simple queries (e.g. in the case 
of a web server they do an http “get”, for a database they 
connect and attempt to do a “select * from table name”). 
Connectivity tests and timeout baselines are provided by 
specialized application/service providers as discussed. If 
services that should be running on that server are not 
running, intelliagents start troubleshooting. Their aim is to 
ensure that local services run at all times and if not restart 
them. Once they achieve this, they perform the prescribed 
connectivity tests again and if there is a problem they 
cannot resolve they notify human administrators (usually 
via email or SMS). 
  Manually created ISSPs have been experimentally 
proven to be the best way to maintain server information, 
as datacentres do not undergo drastic reconfigurations in 
terms of existing devices. We have moved the 
responsibility of monitoring services to each server 
locally. This has been proven to be the safest and less 
“resource” expensive way to keep detailed information 
about servers, services and resources. In addition 
centralised management methodologies have been proven 
unsuccessful in big complex environments [11, 17]. 
3.5 Performance intelliagents 
 
Our performance measurement techniques were 
orientated towards workgroup aggregation. We divided 
our measurements into 5 main groups: 1) Operating 
system, 2) Network, 3) Disks, 4) Application processes 
and 5) User processes. Measurements were kept in a 
special logs directory and were classified first by server 
name and then by measurement group. All measurements 
were recorded in ASCII text files, created by Unix pipes 
through standard output redirection. We observed 1) I/O 
rates on disks and network devices, 2) processes per user 
name, 3) per command name and arguments, 4) per user 
and command name, 5) per CPU and 6) the match 
between network packets, port numbers and protocols. 
  All techniques were non-intrusive as they did not load 
the system they were monitoring. For each monitored 
resource type or workgroup, a dedicated performance 
intelliagent was responsible for collecting performance 
statistics and comparing them against pre-scripted 
baseline thresholds, every 10 or 15 minutes. All collected 
data were manipulated as text strings. Different types of 
measurements were associated together by matching their 
timestamps. Measurements were ordered by timestamp 
and treated as a time series to produce graphical 
representations of the system performance either as a 
whole or by component/workgroup. Each file produced 
by persistent state processes, was managed as a circular 
queue, the length of which was configurable. Every time 
these intelliagents run, they produced flags to indicate 
what happened. Every time, a threshold was exceeded 
they notified us via email or SMS. The tools used, were 
standard Unix tools such as vmstat, iostat, sar, netstat, 
nfsstat, top etc [14]. To determine accurately the 
behaviour of each process, we used microstate 
measurements where applicable, as most modern CPUs 
allow for them. The accuracy of microstate measurements 
is microsecond resolution and the overhead is sub-
microsecond (units are nanoseconds). In this way we had 
very accurate thread and process accounting. More about 
microstate accounting can be found in [6]. 
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 3.6 Baselines and thresholds 
 
Baselines were set based on the hardware configuration of 
each system and the application type it was running. 
These baselines were determined with the help of 
hardware, operating system and application experts, who 
had given us expected application performance times as 
well as our own observations. Every time a baseline 
setting was not proven to be correct, we adjusted it 
accordingly. This happened quite often in the case of 
newly installed applications primarily. Utilisation spikes 
happened quite often, and in these cases we used our 
performance measurements to determine what was wrong. 
We had developed customised system builds for each 
hardware, operating system and application type and we 
made sure that all the servers in the datacentre were built 
as such. This policy was proven very effective as we 
avoided known pitfalls. 
  The measurements we considered for the operating 
systems were: 1) Memory “sr” (scan rate), “po” (page 
out), page faults and free memory measurements to 
determine memory shortage, 2) CPU run queue, to detect 
any processes waiting to be served by any CPU, 3) 
Overall CPU idle time %, 4) Blocked processes waiting 
for I/O, 5) Per process CPU and memory utilization, and 
6) Disk I/O and throughput. We used 30 second intervals 
during I/O measurements to avoid spikes in the load. We 
were interested in the asvc_t and wsvc_t values ( read and 
write response times).  
  For the network we considered: 1) Network interface 
utilisation statistics and errors, 2) Network route 
utilisation, 3) NFS statistics, 4) TCP/IP bandwidth and 
end-to-end round trip latency measurements, 5) Size of 
incoming/outgoing network packets and TCP windows, 6) 
Network connection time to live and 7) Name server 
response (DNS, NIS, NIS+, LDAP). 
  For databases, we used scripts that had a lot of input 
from experienced database administrators. We used a 
combination of Unix tools and SQL commands to 
monitor and measure their performance. We considered 
the following measurements: 1) Time taken for a request 
to connect to the database, 2) Time taken for the request 
to be served by the database, 3) Time taken for the 
database to initialise, 4) Time taken for the database to 
shutdown, 5) Time taken for the database backup to 
complete, 6) Per process CPU and memory utilisation, 7) 
Number of users connected to the database and for how 
long each, 8) Memory allocated at startup, 9) Database 
checkpoints and 10) Memory per transaction. 
  For web servers and application GUIs we considered the 
following measurements: 1) Time taken to connect to 
them, 2) Time taken for the process to come back with the 
results of the query, 3) Per process CPU and memory 
utilization, and 4) Number of http/application connections 
and for how long each. 
  For distributed applications we observed the time taken 
for a request to be served by the entire application from 
beginning to end. Every 15 to 30 minutes we initiated a 
dummy process to run through all application 
components, simulating a user and measure the total 
response time, in addition to the business-as-usual 
requests. 
 
4. Results 
 
One of the sites our work was implemented was a 
financial company of a UK based international customer. 
Servers included SUN, HP, IBM and linux machines. The 
breakdown of machines and their functions were: 100 
database servers, a mixture of Oracle and Sybase 
databases, running on Sun Enterprise Series 4500, and 
E10Ks. 55 transaction processing servers a mixture of 
E10Ks, Ultra 10s, linux, E450s, E220Rs HP K and T 
series and 60 front-end application IBM SP2 servers for 
user front-end financial applications. Services were 
distributed across these servers. All data was residing on 
local disks. The network was 100 Base/T ethernet for all 
servers.  
  Financial analysts used services for data-mining, 
financial projections, financial model evaluations, market 
data/trend simulations and analytical reports. The Load 
Sharing Facility, LSF [16] application was used for 
scheduling jobs against databases. Users via the 
application GUI, manually selected database servers to 
submit jobs or submitted them to be processed at a latter 
time, using either native LSF utilities, or Unix utilities 
like “cron” or “at” jobs. Computations were deployed 
across different geographical sites the customer had. 
Market data feeds would come in from all parts of the 
world from international customer sites and other places 
such as Reuters. 
  The main problem the users had was that application 
components were failing very often and on many 
occasions errors were latent. They had no means to 
automatically correct operational faults. For them 
downtime meant severe financial losses as their systems 
needed to be available on a 24x7 basis. Stock brokers 
needed frequent access to databases, market trend analysis 
reports, forecasts, projection and simulation results, to 
decide how to handle end-customer investments. Because 
it was a high-pressure complex environment, downtime 
had big impacts on service integrity, safety and QoS. 
What was happening on a regular basis was that various 
application components would stop working altogether 
and operators did not know where to start looking. Large 
database jobs scheduled to run overnight would 
frequently crash databases and calculations would not 
complete. Human operators tried to resolve operational 
problems and faults manually. Available services would 
often become unavailable without any explanation and 
0-7695-1926-1/03/$17.00 (C) 2003 IEEE
Proceedings of the International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS’03) 
 users would become increasingly frustrated. The financial 
company would suffer financial losses because analysts 
and researchers could not easily quantify and qualify 
financial models and analyze market trends. Operators 
were under immense pressure to resolve operational faults 
and performance problems under difficult circumstances 
and usually during the night and the end of financial 
periods. 
  The users used for monitoring BMC patrol and 
SystemEdge [6]. The environment was highly complex 
and faults (operational, performance and human errors) 
would make things much worse. Experienced 
administrators were “on-call” every night. Operators had 
the main task of notifying system administrators about 
fatal faults. There were many time-delays caused by 
operators not understanding how critical a fault was, or 
trying to locate the on-call people during the night. It 
could take up to 2 hours at a time for a service or server 
restart, as faults had to be diagnosed and that was difficult 
as services were distributed. In addition, a number of 
people had to be notified about the problem before any 
decisive action was taken (i.e. a server reboot). Often 
experts from more than one areas had to be called in 
together to decide what caused the problem. If 
experienced support people could not diagnose and 
correct remotely a fault, they were obliged to come in to 
work. The whole troubleshooting procedure (and 
subsequent downtime) could take an average of 4 hours in 
such cases. 
  The end users were becoming increasingly frustrated as 
they were having more downtime they could afford and 
the failure of one of more distributed application 
components would impact on service integrity. In Figure 
2, one can see the detailed breakdown in hours based on 
the type of errors that caused downtime at the customer 
site for 1 year, before we implemented our software. Total 
downtime was 550 hours from service-related faults. 345 
hours caused by databases crashing in the middle of a job, 
60 hours caused by human errors, 30 hours caused by 
LSF errors, 40 hours from front-end user application 
downtime, 10 hours caused by firewall 
configuration/network errors, 50 hours from performance-
related errors and 5 hours from services being completely 
unavailable (corruptions, bugs etc) and 10 hours from all 
types of hardware errors. After our work was 
implemented, downtime went down to 31 hours in total. 
The error distribution was, 8 hours from firewall/network 
related errors, 6 hours from various hardware related 
errors, 2 hours from human errors, 9 hours from 
performance errors, 1 hour from LSF errors, 3 hours from 
service front-end errors, 2 hours from complete service 
unavailability errors and 8 hours from databases crashing 
in the middle of a job. Intelliagents were used to monitor, 
troubleshoot and analyse distributed application services, 
servers, and performance. They were also used to 
automatically monitor and reschedule batch jobs if these 
failed. The administration servers generated dynamic 
global service profile lists per database type every 15 
minutes on average. They managed the LSF job-
scheduling tool and presented the best available database 
server for the batch job in a shortlist, with the best choice 
always first. The LSF software was configured to allow a 
finite number of scheduled jobs per database server and 
user access rights were defined at the Unix, the 
application/database and the LSF levels. Only specific 
users would submit specific types of jobs to a pre-
determined group of database servers. 
T OT AL DOW NT IM E  IN HOURS  IN Y E ARS  1 
(before our work)  AND  2 (af ter our work)  
345
8
60
2
50
9
40
3
10
6
30
1
5
2
1
2
Completely Down
LSF
Front- End
FW/NW
Performance
Human
Mid- crash
Figure 2. Breakdown of errors in hours and types for 
2 years before and after our work was implemented. 
Provided by the customer. 
 
  Performance problems were detected and dealt with 
much faster, as performance intelliagents created 
comprehensive reports about what may have caused a 
performance related problem and helped narrow down 
various possibilities. The same applied for operational 
faults. Intelliagent error reporting mechanisms were 
integrated with SystemEdge and notifications were 
presented to operators from within the SystemEdge 
graphical user interface. Every time a fault was dealt with 
manually, we added a new troubleshooting procedure to 
the intelliagent source code and updated static ontologies 
accordingly when necessary. 
  Despite the impressive decrease in downtime our 
software was unable to take care of firewall/network and 
hardware related errors as well as eradicate completely 
human errors.  Faults however, were detected within the 
first 5 minutes of them happening (the intelliagent run 
frequency), as opposed to about 1 hour during day time, 
about 25 hours over the weekends and 10 hours from 
overnight jobs (data provided by the customer using BMC 
Patrol). The customer did not have any means to 
automatically monitor, detect and correct any batch job 
failures or global distributed cluster faults prior to our 
work.  
  Intelliagents, in addition, checked every 5 minutes, if 
LSF processes were running (very often they would 
crash), if databases were up and running (likewise), the 
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 time batch jobs had left to complete (using pre-scripted 
LSF specific commands), if a batch job completed 
successfully (likewise), number of LSF scheduled jobs 
per database server as well as server, network and 
database load. They recorded all measurements and 
emailed summary reports to nominated administrators on 
a daily basis, on demand and whenever a job failed. 
Service intelliagents would attempt to troubleshoot and 
restart crashed processes and databases and they would 
notify human administrators accordingly. If jobs failed, 
intelliagents residing on the administration servers 
resubmitted them not based on the manual LSF settings 
and rules for job submissions, but based on the 
dynamically generated DGSPs. We had modified all 
ontologies to include LSF specific information such as 
number of jobs currently processed, jobs waiting to be 
processed and job number submission limit per database 
server. For this purpose we embedded LSF native 
commands in the service intelliagent source code. The 
reason we chose to use DGSPs, was because every time a 
job crashed a database there were implicit conclusions 
that the user who submitted the job manually either a) did 
not select a powerful enough server, or b) selected a 
server that was already overloaded, or c) the server 
became overloaded later from scheduled job submission, 
or there were d) random or otherwise errors potentially 
responsible for database or server crashes. 
  These intelliagents, were also using SLKTs to select a 
server of equal or higher in power than the server that 
failed, i.e. if the failed server had 4 CPUs, 4 GBs of RAM 
and was a of a specific model, their selection process 
would “prefer” first a server of the same model with more 
CPUs and memory. Choosing “randomly” a server for 
resubmitting a failed job, without any knowledge of its 
past job submission history and failures, although not 
ideal, significantly decreased downtime from database 
crashes in the middle of a job. If intelliagents were unable 
to allocate a server for job submission at all for any 
reason, or if a server had crashed, they emailed human 
operators to manually troubleshoot the failed machine. 
  Figures 3 and 4 show respectively the average CPU and 
memory utilisation per system by intelliagents as opposed 
to BMC Patrol. Both cases clearly demonstrate the small 
percentage of system resources used on each system. 
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Figure 3. Intelliagent average CPU utilisation as 
opposed to BMC Patrol on a server at peak times. 
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Figure 4. System Memory consumed by BMC patrol 
and intelliagents on the same server at peak time. 
 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
Our approach has, experimentally, increased quality of 
service for Unix-based multi-component distributed 
services. From 550 hours of total downtime within a year 
before any of our parts of our work were implemented, 
downtime went down to 31 hours in total the next year.  
  Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows. In 
the case of complex multi-component applications local 
application-specific detection/correction mechanisms 
work much better than generic troubleshooting 
approaches. The distributed manner intelliagents work 
ensures that the more components an application is 
consisted of, the higher the probability is it will not fail if 
it is managed in this way. Agent code and ontologies are 
easily maintainable and do not tax the system they look 
after because of their size and simplicity. They are not 
memory resident and the flags they produce pinpoint 
errors accurately. Automated error detection and 
correction techniques improve quality of service as errors 
are picked up faster than ever before. Methodical, 
structured performance measurement and collection 
techniques can help resolve performance related issues 
and bottlenecks more efficiently and effectively. 
Administrators can generate timelines of system 
behaviour and observe similar behavioural patterns. In 
addition, they are notified automatically every time a 
threshold is exceeded. 
  Much work remains to be done, so our error detection 
and correction techniques are further improved and 
become more generic. We are also trying to reduce as 
much as possible manual input and generate automatically 
static ontologies.  Performance modelling and dynamic 
troubleshooting of performance-related problems need 
further work. As we are not software developers, we used 
Unix shell languages as the best and easiest way to test 
our theories. The intelliagent source code can be 
improved in that respect. Our approach, as is, at the 
moment cannot cater for network or obscure logical errors 
and needs manual input. It can however deal with latent 
errors up to a point, by restarting failed component 
applications. Extended logging of all system and 
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 intelliagent activities, ensure that human administrators 
have comprehensive information about all infrastructure 
aspects and can narrow down their search options when 
they do manual troubleshooting. 
  Our research continues in all these areas, in the hope that 
we’ll improve our software and methodology further. 
Additional future work includes integrating our agent 
software with the grid technology. We hope the way 
agents generate dynamic global service lists (that contain 
information about all agent-enabled services) can be used 
in someway in the grid resource discovery and selection 
mechanisms for semantic grids. Intelliagents can manage 
quality of service very effectively for any distributed Unix 
application cluster, or standalone hosts by ensuring that 
all service components are available in the sequence they 
are meant to be. Service integrity and safety are protected 
in this way, as all interdependent distributed application 
components must be up and running for the distributed 
service to be considered healthy. If services are 
unavailable or take long to respond, intelliagents based on 
pre-scripted scenarios, try to restore them. If they are 
unable to do so, human administrators are notified so they 
can fix the problem. In that respect, services will not have 
resources vanishing unexpectedly without any 
explanations. Frequent monitoring ensures that service or 
server related faults are picked up and dealt with 
promptly. 
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